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ANIMAL RIGHTS WITHOUT 
CONTROVERSY 
JEFF LESLIE* 
CASS R. SUNSTEIN** 
I 
INTRODUCTION 
Many consumers would be willing to pay something to reduce the suffering 
of animals used as food. Unfortunately, they do not and cannot, because 
existing markets do not disclose the relevant treatment of animals, even though 
that treatment would trouble many consumers. Steps should be taken to 
promote disclosure so as to fortify market processes and to promote democratic 
discussion of the treatment of animals. In the context of animal welfare, a 
serious problem is that people’s practices ensure outcomes that defy their 
existing moral commitments. A disclosure regime could improve animal welfare 
without making it necessary to resolve the most deeply contested questions in 
this domain. 
II 
OF THEORIES AND PRACTICES 
To all appearances, disputes over animal rights produce an extraordinary 
amount of polarization and acrimony. Some people believe that those who 
defend animal rights are zealots, showing an inexplicable willingness to sacrifice 
important human interests for the sake of rats, pigs, and salmon. Judge Richard 
Posner, for example, refers to “the siren song of animal rights,”1 while Richard 
Epstein complains that recognition of an “animal right to bodily integrity . . . 
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ANIMAL RIGHTS: CURRENT DEBATES AND NEW DIRECTIONS 51, 74 (Cass R. Sunstein & Martha C. 
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will not happen, and it should not happen.”2 Others believe that those who 
ridicule animal rights are morally obtuse, replicating some of the cruelty and 
abuse of sexism, slavery, and even the Holocaust. Gary Francione, a prominent 
defender of animal rights, contends that animals should have “the right not to 
be treated as our property.”3 
The intensity of certain conflicts over animal rights obscures an important 
fact: Almost everyone agrees that animal suffering matters, and that it is 
legitimate to take steps to reduce it. In a 1995 poll, for example, two-thirds of 
Americans agreed with the following statement: “An animal’s right to live free 
of suffering should be just as important as a person’s right to be free of 
suffering.”4 This statement of equivalence almost certainly does not adequately 
reflect people’s reflective judgments; but it is surely true that a social consensus 
supports the view that in deciding what to do, both private and public 
institutions should take animal suffering into account.5 
Of course people disagree about how people should treat animals. But the 
tension between competing beliefs is less remarkable than the tension between 
widespread practices and widespread moral commitments. Every day of every 
year, people engage in practices that ensure extraordinary suffering for animals. 
If those practices were highly visible, they would change because many people 
already believe they are morally unacceptable. This point makes existing 
treatment of animals extremely unusual. A great deal of progress could be 
 
 2. Richard A. Epstein, Animals as Objects, or Subjects, of Rights, in ANIMAL RIGHTS: CURRENT 
DEBATES AND NEW DIRECTIONS, supra note 1, at 157. 
 3. Gary L. Francione, Animals—Property or Persons?, in ANIMAL RIGHTS: CURRENT DEBATES 
AND NEW DIRECTIONS, supra note 1, at 108. 
 4. David Foster, Animal Rights Gain Support, Poll Shows, THE SEATTLE TIMES, Dec. 3, 1995, at 
A4. 
 5. Studies have consistently shown this to be true. For instance, ninety-one percent of Americans 
believe that the U.S. Department of Agriculture should be involved in safeguarding humane treatment 
of animals. Amanda Tolles & Steve Dyott, Consumers Seek to Curb Farm Animal Suffering, 96 BUS. & 
SOC’Y REV. 19 (1996). A more recent study on New Jerseyans’ opinions on animal treatment found 
that the vast majority of consumers were opposed to several treatment practices common among 
producers: eighty-three percent of those polled felt that confining pregnant pigs and veal calves to stalls 
too small for them to turn around or stretch out should not be allowed; eighty-two percent were against 
cutting off the tails of cows or pigs without use of pain killers; eighty-one percent were against 
withholding food from chickens for up to fourteen days to increase egg production; seventy-eighty 
percent were against transporting livestock that are emaciated or unable to stand up; and seventy-four 
percent were against feeding calves liquid diets with no fiber or iron. EAGLETON INSTITUTE OF 
POLITICS CENTER FOR PUBLIC INTEREST POLLING, NEW JERSEYANS’ OPINIONS ON HUMANE 
STANDARDS FOR TREATMENT OF LIVESTOCK 4 (2003) (performed on behalf of Farm Sanctuary), 
http://www.njfarms.org/NJ_opinons.pdf. The study also asked how important it was to respondents that 
farm animals and livestock in New Jersey be treated humanely; sixty-five percent replied that it was 
very important and twenty-four percent somewhat important. Id. at 16. Similarly, surveys conducted in 
the European Union in 2005 found that over eighty-five percent of respondents believed that animals 
should be treated much better in production systems. FARM ANIMAL WELFARE COUNCIL, REPORT 
ON WELFARE LABELING 16 (2006), available at http://www.fawc.org.uk/reports/welfarelabel-0606.pdf. 
For a summary of studies of public opinion on animal welfare through 2001, see Harold Herzog, 
Andrew Rowan, & Daniel Kossow, Social Attitudes and Animals, in THE STATE OF ANIMALS: 2001 55, 
65–66 (Deborah J. Salem & Andrew Rowan eds., 2001), available at http://www.hsus.org/press_ 
and_publications/humane_bookshelf/the_state_of_the_animals_2001.html (last visited July 25, 2006). 
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made, not by challenging existing moral judgments, but by ensuring that they 
are actually respected. 
Our central goal in this article is to suggest a simple way to bring current 
practices and moral judgments into closer alignment. In short, consumers 
should be informed of the treatment of animals used for food, so that they can 
make knowledgeable choices about what food to buy. Disclosure of animal 
treatment would make markets work better; it would also ensure more and 
better democratic discussion about the treatment of animals. Moreover, it 
would be possible to accomplish both of these goals without taking a stand on 
the issues that most sharply divide people. People might, in short, come to 
agreement on a relevant practice—one of disclosure—amidst uncertainty or 
disagreement about the most fundamental issues. As a result, they might well 
protect numerous animals from serious suffering. To understand these claims, it 
is necessary to back up a bit. 
III 
LAWS AND GAPS 
In 1789, the year of the ratification of America’s Bill of Rights, Jeremy 
Bentham argued: 
The day may come, when the rest of the animal creation may acquire those rights 
which never could have been withholden from them but by the hand of tyranny. The 
French have already discovered that the blackness of the skin is no reason why a 
human being should be abandoned without redress to the caprice of a tormentor. . . . 
[A] full-grown horse or dog is beyond comparison a more rational, as well as a more 
conversable animal, than an infant of a day, or a week, or even month, old. But 
suppose the case were otherwise, what would it avail? [T]he question is not, Can they 
reason? [N]or, Can they talk? [B]ut, Can they suffer?6 
In his time, Bentham’s argument to this effect was exceptionally 
controversial. But the argument is no longer much contested. Consider, for 
example, the fact that every state of the union has long maintained anticruelty 
laws specifically designed to reduce the suffering of animals.7 Of course, the 
idea of “rights” can be understood in many different ways, and it is possible to 
understand the term in a way that would deny that animals can have them.8 But 
if the idea of rights is taken in pragmatic terms, to mean legal protection against 
harm, then many animals already do have rights, simply because they enjoy 
such protection. And if we take the term “rights” to entail a moral claim to such 
 
 6. See JEREMY BENTHAM, THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS AND LEGISLATION 310–11 n.1 
(Prometheus Books 1988) (1789). 
 7. See generally Pamela D. Frasch et al., State Anti-Animal Cruelty Statutes: An Overview, 5 
ANIMAL L. 69 (1999) (reviewing anti-cruelty statutes and penalties in all fifty states and the District of 
Columbia); see also Stephan K. Otto, State Animal Protection Laws—The Next Generation, 11 ANIMAL 
L. 131 (2005) (detailing the modern trend towards strengthening anticruelty laws still further). 
 8. See JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 505 (1971) (suggesting that animals deserve 
consideration but not justice). For a critique, see MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, FRONTIERS OF JUSTICE: 
DISABILITY, NATIONALITY, SPECIES MEMBERSHIP ch. 6 (2006). 
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protection, there is general agreement that animals do have rights of certain 
kinds. 
Of course, some people, including Descartes, have argued that animals are 
like robots and lack emotions—and that people should be allowed to treat them 
however they choose.9 But almost everyone agrees that people should not be 
able to torture animals or to engage in acts of cruelty against them. It is in 
response to this agreement that state laws contain a wide range of protections 
against cruelty and neglect.10 
In the United States, state anticruelty laws go well beyond prohibiting 
beating, injuring, and the like, and impose affirmative duties on people having 
animals in their care. In New York, for example, people may not transport an 
animal in a cruel or inhumane manner, or in such a way as to subject it to 
torture or suffering, conditions that can come about through neglect.11 People 
who transport animals by railroad or car are required to allow the animals out 
for rest, feeding, and water every five hours.12 Nonowners who have impounded 
or confined an animal are obliged to provide good air, water, shelter, and food.13 
Those who abandon an animal, including a pet, in public places face criminal 
penalties.14 A separate provision forbids people from torturing, beating, 
maiming, or killing any animal, and also requires people to provide adequate 
food and drink.15 
Indeed, New York makes it a crime not to provide necessary sustenance, 
food, water, and shelter.16 New York also forbids overworking an animal, or 
using the animal for work when it is not physically fit.17 Compare in this regard 
the unusually protective California statute, which imposes criminal liability for 
negligent as well as intentional overworking, overdriving, or torturing of 
animals.18 “Torture” is defined not in its ordinary sense, but includes any act or 
omission “whereby unnecessary or unjustifiable physical pain or suffering is 
caused or permitted . . . .”19 
If taken seriously, provisions of this kind would do a great deal to protect 
animals from suffering, injury, and premature death. But protection of animal 
welfare under state law is sharply limited for two major reasons. First, 
enforcement can occur only through public prosecution. If horses and cows are 
 
 9. See RENE DESCARTES, DISCOURSE ON THE METHOD AND MEDITATIONS ON FIRST 
PHILOSOPHY 34–36 (David Weissman ed., Elizabeth S. Haldane & G. R. T. Ross trans., Yale Univ. 
Press 1996) (1637). 
 10. See supra note 7. 
 11. See N.Y. AGRIC. & MKTS. LAW § 359(1) (McKinney 1991). 
 12. See id. § 359(2). 
 13. See id. § 356. 
 14. See id. § 355. 
 15. See id. § 353. 
 16. See id. §§ 353, 356. 
 17. See id. § 353. 
 18. See CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 597(b), 599b (West 1999). 
 19. Id. § 599b. 
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being beaten at a local farm, or if greyhounds are forced to live in small cages, 
protection will come only if the prosecutor decides to provide it. Of course 
prosecutors have limited budgets, and animal protection is rarely a high-priority 
item. The result is that violations of state law occur with some frequency, and, 
realistically speaking, there is no way to prevent those violations. In this respect, 
the anticruelty prohibitions sharply contrast with most prohibitions protecting 
human beings, which can be enforced both publicly and privately. For example, 
the prohibitions on assault and theft can be enforced through criminal 
prosecutions brought by public officials, and also by injured citizens, proceeding 
directly against those who have violated the law. 
Second, and even more significantly, the anticruelty provisions of state law 
contain extraordinarily large exceptions. They generally do not apply to the use 
of animals for medical or scientific purposes. More importantly, they do not 
apply to the production and use of animals as food. About ten billion animals 
are killed for food annually in the United States;20 twenty-three million chickens 
and some 268,000 pigs are slaughtered every day.21 The cruel and abusive 
practices generally involved in contemporary farming are largely unregulated at 
the state level. On factory farms, animals 
live out their short lives in a shadow world. The vast majority never experience 
sunshine, grass, trees, fresh air, unfettered movement, sex, or many other things that 
make up most of what we think of as the ordinary pattern of life on earth. They are 
castrated without anesthesia, on occasion deliberately starved, live in conditions of 
extreme and unrelieved crowding, and suffer physical deformities as a result of genetic 
manipulation.22 
Consider, for example, the lives of pregnant pigs, which spend much of their 
time in small metal stalls, lined up in such a way that they are unable to turn 
around or take more than a single step forward or back. After giving birth, they 
are impregnated again, and again, until they are slaughtered at three years of 
age.23 Young calves spend their lives in small wooden stalls, unable to turn 
around. To ensure that their flesh remains white, they are frequently kept 
anemic.24 Almost all egg-producing chickens live in battery cages.  Typically, 
eight or more hens are placed in cages that are twenty inches by nineteen 
inches, where they are unable to spread their wings. Because the cages are so 
crowded, the weakest birds become ill and die. Producers cut off the hens’ 
beaks because of the wounds that would occur from fighting, which is inevitable 
in such close quarters. Because beaks are the major method by which hens 
explore their world, the loss of beaks causes lifelong suffering.25 
 
 20. David J. Wolfson & Mariann Sullivan, Foxes in the Hen House: Animals, Agribusiness and the 
Law: A Modern American Fable, in ANIMAL RIGHTS: CURRENT DEBATES AND NEW DIRECTIONS, 
supra note 1, at 206. By contrast, hunters and trappers, animal shelters, biomedical research, product 
testing, dissection, and fur farms combined are responsible for 218 million animal deaths per year. Id. 
 21. Id. 
 22. Id. at 217–18. 
 23. See id. at 218 for a description of customary pig-farming practices. 
 24. Id. at 219. 
 25. See id. at 218 for a description of customary chicken-farming practices. 
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This is simply an illustration of the kind of suffering that is ensured by 
existing practices.26 Short of radical change of the kind that is sought by some 
animal rights activists,27 what might be done by way of correction? 
IV 
GAP-FILLING 
It would be possible to respond to the gaps in existing anticruelty laws in 
various ways. The least controversial response might be to narrow the 
“enforcement gap” by allowing private suits to be brought in cases of cruelty 
and neglect. Reforms might be adopted with the limited purpose of stopping 
conduct that is already against the law so that the law actually means, in 
practice, what it says on paper. With such reforms, representatives of animals 
would be able to bring private suits to ensure that anticruelty and related laws 
are actually enforced. If, for example, a farm is treating horses cruelly and in 
violation of legal requirements, a suit could be brought on behalf of those 
animals to bring about compliance with the law. At first glance, it is not clear 
why anyone should oppose an effort to promote greater enforcement of existing 
law by supplementing the prosecutor’s power with private lawsuits. 
An increase in enforcement would not, however, do anything to reduce the 
mistreatment of animals used for food, which is the most important problem. In 
many nations, regulatory steps have been taken to reduce that mistreatment. 
The United States lags far behind Europe on this count. Sweden forbids 
gestation crates, requires cows and pigs to have access to straw and litter in their 
stalls, and bans drugs or hormones except for the treatment of disease.28 
Switzerland prohibits battery cages and requires calves to receive sufficient iron 
in their diets.29 The United Kingdom forbids both anemic diets for veal calves 
and veal crates.30 The European Union has banned veal crates, gestation crates, 
and all battery-egg production; it is replacing the latter system with much larger 
spaces for hens and free-range farming.31 
The United States could easily move in this direction—and it could do so 
without getting into especially contested moral territory (though perhaps at 
significant cost). But we propose an alternative, or perhaps complementary, 
 
 26. For a more detailed overview, see PETER SINGER, ANIMAL LIBERATION 95–157 (rev. ed., 
Ecco 2002) (1975). 
 27. See, e.g., Francione, supra note 3, at 108. However one may view the argument on the merits, 
the contention that animals should receive equal consideration with humans, and should not be viewed 
in any way as property or as resources for human use, has not made much headway in practical, 
political terms.  The disclosure proposal set forth in this article is much more modest, and could lead to 
real improvements in animal welfare of a kind that could be supported by people with a range of beliefs 
about the moral status of animals. 
 28. Wolfson & Sullivan, supra note 20, at 222. 
 29. Id. 
 30. Id. 
 31. Id. For an overview, see PETER STEVENSON, EUROPEAN UNION LAW ON THE WELFARE OF 
FARM ANIMALS (2004), http://www.ciwf.org.uk/publications/reports/EU_Law_2004.pdf. 
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approach. Among the most dramatic developments of the last decades of 
American law has been the shift from command-and-control regulation to 
disclosure of information as a regulatory tool.32 In countless areas, government 
has required agencies and companies not to alter their practices, but to disclose 
them. Sometimes the goal is to make democratic processes work better by 
providing people with information to inform their political judgments. The 
Toxic Release Inventory, for example, requires companies to disclose their 
toxic releases in a way that can activate political processes.33 So too, the 
National Environmental Policy Act makes agencies discuss, in public, the 
environmental effects of their activities, in part so that citizens can bring their 
concerns to bear.34 And sometimes the goal is to make markets work better by 
giving people information that bears on their choices. Most familiarly, cigarette 
manufacturers must offer information about the health risks associated with 
smoking;35 much more ambitiously, food is now sold with information about the 
ingredients and nutritional content.36 In all these contexts, significant behavioral 
changes have occurred.37 
It is worth underlining the two different justifications for disclosure 
strategies. First, such strategies can improve markets by letting consumers know 
what they are purchasing. This point holds most obviously when consumers lack 
information that bears on their own welfare—as, for example, when consumers 
do not know about a safety risk associated with a product or activity. But if 
consumers also have moral concerns that bear on the use of a product, the 
market-improving potential of disclosure continues to hold.  When people 
purchase a good, they care whether it will do what it is supposed to do and 
whether it will impose risks. But sometimes they also care about its production, 
and in particular about whether their decisions are producing moral or immoral 
 
 32. For an overview, see MARY GRAHAM, DEMOCRACY BY DISCLOSURE: THE RISE OF 
TECHNOPOPULISM (The Brookings Institution 2002); CASS R. SUNSTEIN, RISK AND REASON: 
SAFETY, LAW, AND THE ENVIRONMENT 191–228 (2002). 
 33. See 42 U.S.C. § 11023 (2000).  For a discussion of the success of the Toxic Release Inventory, 
see Archon Fung & Dara O’Rourke, Reinventing Environmental Regulation from the Grassroots Up: 
Explaining and Expanding the Success of the Toxics Release Inventory, 25 ENVTL. MGMT. 115 (2000). 
 34. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321–70 (2000). 
 35. See Comprehensive Smoking Education Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1331–40 (1994) (requiring inclusion 
of one of four warnings on cigarette advertising and packaging: (1) Smoking Causes Lung Cancer, 
Heart Disease and May Complicate Pregnancy; (2) Quitting Smoking Now Greatly Reduces Serious 
Risks to Your Health; (3) Smoking by Pregnant Women May Result in Fetal Injury, Premature Birth, 
and Low Birth Weight; and (4) Cigarette Smoke Contains Carbon Monoxide). 
 36. See Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C.S. § 343(i) (requiring ingredient list to 
avoid misbranding), § 343(q) (requiring nutritional information to avoid misbranding) (2001). 
 37. See COUNCIL ON ENVTL. QUALITY, THE NATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY ACT: A 
STUDY OF ITS EFFECTIVENESS AFTER TWENTY-FIVE YEARS 29 (1997) (noting that prior to NEPA, 
agency decisions were made without reference to environmental information); Fung & O’Rourke, 
supra note 33 (detailing the success of the TRI and recommending application of TRI structure to other 
contexts); Madhu Khanna et al., Toxics Release Information: A Policy Tool for Environmental 
Protection, 36 J. ENVTL. ECON. & MGMT. 243, 243–45 (1998) (discussing the regulatory effect of the 
Toxic Release Inventory on industry behavior); Sunstein, supra note 32, at 191–228 (discussing the 
effects of various informational regimes). 
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behavior. Many consumers are willing to pay to produce less in the way of 
moral damage and more in the way of moral benefit. 
Second, disclosure requirements can serve democratic functions by enabling 
citizens to receive information that bears on democratic judgments. Perhaps 
most consumers would be willing to pay little to improve animal welfare; 
perhaps the social role of consumer, when costs may be paramount, will 
dampen their ordinary moral concerns; perhaps the obvious collective-action 
problem may lead most or many consumers to pay little attention on the theory 
that their individual decisions will have little or no effect. But even if this is so, 
information about animal suffering may have significant effects on the political 
domain. It may energize public debate, activating ordinary citizens and 
representatives alike. To the extent that this effect is a product of increased 
information, exposing practices previously hidden from public view, there is 
every reason to welcome it. 
Now engage in a thought experiment, one with a science fictional element: 
Imagine that people could be informed, immediately and costlessly, of the 
treatment of animals used in the food they purchase. Imagine too that the 
disclosure is not tendentious or biased—that every effort is made to present the 
relevant facts and to do so accurately. If so informed, consumers could purchase 
food as they see fit. To the extent that they were willing to pay for 
improvements in animal welfare, they could do exactly that. Extending the 
thought experiment, imagine a market in which consumers not only knew about 
the treatment of animals used for food, but also could pay in specified 
increments for better treatment (including no suffering at all). By hypothesis, 
the “animal welfare market” would be perfected in the sense that animal 
welfare would be bought and sold and in a way that is highly likely to lead to 
real improvements. 
Of course, there is much to say about this thought experiment. Many animal 
welfare advocates would see a step in this direction as distressingly cautious and 
even problematic. What if consumers are not, in fact, willing to sacrifice much 
for animal welfare? Should animal welfare really be bought and sold, or does 
this create a kind of market in suffering in a way that would be self-evidently 
unacceptable in the domain of human beings? Should we not be able to agree 
that the welfare of animals counts, independently of how much consumers are 
willing to pay to improve it? Why should the suffering of animals depend on 
how much people are willing to pay to reduce it? These are excellent questions, 
and we do not attempt to answer them here.38 But at least it can be said that for 
those who are interested in animal welfare, a movement in the direction of the 
 
 38. Clearly, those who believe that society should prohibit the use of animals for food will not be 
satisfied with a disclosure regime. They might even conclude that it is counterproductive to their cause 
if the disclosure regime led consumers to conclude that buying humanely produced meat satisfied all 
their moral obligations to animals. On the other hand, animal-use abolitionists might embrace a 
disclosure regime for instrumental reasons if they thought it would cause society to confront the harms 
suffered by animals and move society closer to an abolitionist perspective. 
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thought experiment is likely to do far more good than harm, or some good and 
no harm—and that if one goal of law is to ensure that social practices are in line 
with social values, the experiment is highly suggestive. 
There are also evident pragmatic problems. This thought experiment is just 
that. No technology can ensure that consumers could be immediately and 
costlessly informed of the treatment of animals in relevant foods. But if the 
thought experiment is of interest, we can immediately see that it is possible to 
take steps in its direction. Some animal-welfare organizations and even industry 
groups have attempted to do exactly that by developing guidelines and 
certification programs for food producers who claim to use humane animal-
husbandry techniques. These are laudable steps and warrant close examination. 
For reasons discussed below, however, the existing guidelines and certification 
programs do not go nearly far enough in giving consumers the information they 
need to make informed choices. Much more can be done to give consumers 
relevant information at the point of purchase, allowing them to compare 
producers and take account of the treatment of animals in their purchasing 
decisions. Let us now turn to existing practice. 
V 
GUIDELINES AND CERTIFICATION: A PROGRESS REPORT 
The first animal-welfare organization to promulgate humane animal-
husbandry guidelines was the Royal Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to 
Animals (RSPCA), headquartered in the United Kingdom.39 Various animal-
welfare organizations in the United States and Canada have followed suit with 
their own guidelines, including Humane Farm Animal Care,40 the American 
Humane Association,41 the Animal Welfare Institute,42 and the British Columbia 
Society for Prevention of Cruelty to Animals.43 Some of these groups, like 
 
 39. The RSPCA guidelines program began in 1994. See Freedom Food—About Us, 
http://www.rspca.org.uk/servlet/Satellite?pagename=RSPCA/RSPCARedirect&pg=About_the_rspca 
(last visited Feb. 8, 2006). For the RSPCA’s substantive guidelines on Chickens, Beef Cattle, Dairy 
Cattle, Ducks, Laying Hens, Pullets, Pigs, Farmed Atlantic Salmon, Sheep (including Dairy Sheep), and 
Turkeys, see http://www.rspca.org.uk/servlet/Satellite?pagename=RSPCA/RSPCARedirect&pg= 
welfarestandards (last visited Feb. 8, 2006). 
 40. Humane Farm Animal Care: Animal Care Standards, http://www.certifiedhumane.com/ 
documentation.asp (last visited Jan. 31, 2006) (listing guidelines for Beef Cattle; Broiler Chickens; Egg 
Laying Hens; Dairy Cows; Dairy, Fiber, and Meat Goats; Pigs; Sheep, including Dairy Sheep; Turkeys; 
and Young Dairy Beef). All guidelines are available with registration. 
 41. American Humane Association, Free Farmed Certification Program, http://www.american 
humane.org/freefarmed (last visited Jan. 31, 2006). Animal welfare standards are not available online, 
but can be requested by calling (303) 792-9900 or by writing American Humane, 63 Inverness Drive 
East, Englewood, CO 80112. 
 42. Animal Welfare Institute, http://www.awionline.org/farm/standards.htm (last visited Jan. 31, 
2006) (listing Humane Husbandry Criteria for Pigs, Beef Cattle and Calves, Rabbits, Ducks, and 
Sheep). 
 43. British Columbia Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals, 
http://www.spca.bc.ca/farm/standards.asp (last visited Jan. 31, 2006) (listing SPCA Certified Standards 
for the Raising & Handling of Laying Hens, Broiler Chickens, Beef Cattle, Pigs, and Dairy Cattle). 
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RSPCA, go further and license producers who conform to their guidelines. The 
RSPCA authorizes producers to carry the “Freedom Food” logo, Humane 
Farm Animal Care has its own “Certified Humane Raised and Handled” logo,44 
and the American Humane Association sponsors the “Free Farmed” logo.45 
Trade groups that have adopted humane animal husbandry guidelines include 
the American Meat Institute,46 the National Chicken Council,47 the National 
Pork Board,48 United Egg Producers,49 and the Food Marketing Institute, a trade 
group for supermarkets, food retailers and wholesalers, which has issued 
guidelines jointly with the National Council of Chain Restaurants.50 Whole 
Foods, a prominent grocery store chain, recently announced its own “Animal 
Compassionate” standards, though its website indicates that no producers have 
yet met these new standards.51 
At first glance, guidelines of this kind might be taken as a form of voluntary 
self-regulation, in a way that could do considerable good. Imagine that market 
pressures, in which consumers lack information, lead to a kind of competition 
that produces increasingly harsh treatment of animals. Suppose that those who 
produce and sell food have every incentive to produce tasty food cheaply and 
that the market creates high levels of neglect, cruelty, and suffering simply 
because producers will lose customers if producers take animal-protective steps. 
Imagine too that if they seek to protect animal welfare, companies need to 
cartelize in some way in order to break (or brake) the competition. A set of 
guidelines might seem ideally suited to that task, at least if they are enforceable 
through informal sanctions (including moral suasion). Rather than activating 
consumer concerns, such guidelines might even reflect moral judgments on the 
part of producers themselves, operating as the motivation for a check on the 
profit motive. 
In actual operation, existing guidelines have four different uses. First, they 
serve as a self-assessment tool for producers, helping them to see whether their 
 
 44. The Royal Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals, supra note 39.  For more details 
on the “Certified Raised and Handled” logo, see Humane Farm Animal Care, 
http://www.certifiedhumane.com (last visited Jan. 31, 2006). 
 45. American Humane Association, supra note 41. 
 46. AMERICAN MEAT INSTITUTE, RECOMMENDED ANIMAL HANDLING GUIDELINES AND 
AUDIT GUIDE (2005),  http://www.animalhandling.org/guidelines/2005RecAnimalHandling 
Guidelines.pdf.  
 47. NATIONAL CHICKEN COUNCIL, ANIMAL WELFARE GUIDELINES AND AUDIT CHECKLIST 
(2005), http://www.nationalchickencouncil.com/files/AnimalWelfare2005.pdf. 
 48. NATIONAL PORK BOARD, SWINE WELFARE ASSURANCE PROGRAM MANUAL (2003), 
http://www.pork.org/Producers/SWAP/swapManual.aspx. 
 49. UNITED EGG PRODUCERS CERTIFIED, ANIMAL HUSBANDRY GUIDELINES FOR U.S. EGG 
LAYING FLOCKS (2006), http://www.uepcertified.com/abouttheprogram.html. 
 50. Food Marketing Institute, http://www.fmi.org/animal_welfare (last visited Dec. 6, 2006). 
Guidelines can be requested from Karen Brown at FMI  by calling (202) 452-8444. 
 51. Whole Foods, Animal Compassionate Program, http://www.wholefoodsmarket.com/products/ 
meat-poultry/qualitystandards.html (last visited Dec. 6, 2006);  see also Andrew Martin, Meat Labels 
Hope to Lure the Sensitive Carnivore, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 24, 2006, at A1 (describing the Whole Foods 
program). 
05__LESLIE_SUNSTEIN.DOC 7/20/2007  9:36 AM 
Winter 2007] ANIMAL RIGHTS WITHOUT CONTROVERSY 127 
activities comply with certain baseline moral requirements. Second, guidelines 
operate as a means for retailers to assess and hold accountable their suppliers, 
transporters, processors, and other links in the chain of production. Third, and 
not trivially, they work as a public relations strategy for enhancing the image of 
a producer group—a goal that should not be underrated in light of the risks of 
bad publicity and eventual regulation. Finally, guidelines provide a basis for 
certification programs for producers who want to make certain claims about 
their humane methods. This last purpose is the only one directly connected to 
consumer disclosure, which is our emphasis here. Note, however, that even 
guidelines not explicitly aimed at the consumer market are part of an ongoing 
campaign to win over consumers (and, most likely, to forestall government 
initiatives in this area). Consider in this regard the National Pork Board’s 
explanation for launching the Swine Welfare Assurance Program: 
Animal rights and humane groups have escalated their efforts to a new level—one that 
impacts what consumers think of pork. Communications with fast food chains and 
retailers indicate that responsibility for animal welfare assurances may be transferred 
back to the producer. . . . [T]he Swine Welfare Assurance Program™, or SWAP™, . . . 
[is] the pork industry’s proactive initiative to this increasing consumer awareness of 
animal welfare.52 
Guidelines of this sort could do a great deal of good, and both producers 
and trade groups have trumpeted their existence. In light of their goals, the 
trumpeting is understandable. Unfortunately, the guidelines have proved 
woefully inadequate, at least as a means of disclosing useful information to 
consumers. A central reason is that the guidelines address different aspects of 
animal treatment with different levels of detail, making comparisons 
exceedingly difficult. Consider the guidelines for pigs. The American Meat 
Institute’s (AMI) guidelines address humane handling and slaughtering 
practices at meatpacking facilities for pigs.53 Humane Farm Animal Care adopts 
the AMI guidelines for slaughter; it also covers a host of farming practices, 
including guidelines for food and water, design of buildings, lying areas, space 
allowances, and transportation, to name a few.54 The Animal Welfare Institute 
guidelines and the National Pork Board guidelines each address farming 
practices for pigs but not slaughtering issues.55 
The competing guidelines for pig farming are complex and cover many, but 
not all, of the same activities. The National Pork Board guidelines address, in 
close to forty pages, herd health and nutrition, caretaker training, animal 
observation, body condition, euthanasia, handling and movement, facilities 
including ventilation, heating and cooling, physical space, pen maintenance, 
feeder space, water availability, and hospital pens, emergency support, and 
 
 52. Swine Welfare Assurance Program, Why a Welfare Assurance Program?, 
http://www.porkboard.org/SWAPHome (last visited Feb. 1, 2006). 
 53. AMERICAN MEAT INSTITUTE, supra note 46. 
 54. See Humane Farm Animal Care: Animal Care Standards, Pigs, supra note 40. 
 55. See Animal Welfare Institute, supra note 42; NATIONAL PORK BOARD, supra note 48. 
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continuing assessment and education.56 The Animal Welfare Institute addresses, 
in nine pages, environmental enrichment and shelter; access to the outdoors; 
space and grouping requirements; light; bedding management; environmental 
minimums and enrichment; hygiene and safety; loading, unloading, and 
transport; actions in case of injury or illness; antibiotics and other treatments; 
and food and water.57 Many of the guidelines are quantitative—laying out, for 
instance, precise dimensions of farrowing pens for pigs58 and specifying 
permissible water flow rates required in drinking systems.59 
How well could the average consumer draw comparisons based on these 
guidelines? The length and complexity of the guidelines make them quite 
inaccessible to the lay reader. Unless a consumer is an expert on animal 
husbandry, or is willing to become one, it will be impossible to detect and 
evaluate the substantive differences between the competing guidelines. And 
much care is taken not to distinguish one producer from another, at least not in 
any way that is visible to consumers.60 By themselves, then, existing guidelines 
are hopelessly inadequate as a tool for informing those who buy food. 
The certification programs for producers hold far more promise. In the 
United States, Humane Farm Animal Care has developed the “Certified 
Humane” certification and labeling program,61 and the American Humane 
Association maintains the “Free Farmed” certification and labeling program.62 
Both programs are voluntary, user-fee-based services whereby producers 
submit information and undergo inspections leading up to certification. 
Inspectors have training in veterinary medicine, animal science, and related 
fields, and may be employees of the certifying organization or independent 
contractors.63 On the industry side, only the United Egg Producers (UEP) has 
developed a certification program.64 To be certified to carry UEP’s label on its 
eggs, a producer must follow UEP’s guidelines at all of its production facilities, 
 
 56. NATIONAL PORK BOARD, supra note 48. 
 57. See Animal Welfare Institute, Humane Husbandry Criteria for Pigs, supra note 42. 
 58. See, e.g., Humane Farm Animal Care: Animal Care Standards, Pigs, supra note 40, at 9 
(requiring that farrowing pens be a minimum of 5 ft. x 7 ft., but recommending pens of 10 ft. x 10 ft., 
with a piglet protection zone of at least 8 sq. ft.). 
 59. See, e.g., id. at 4 (requiring a minimum flow rate of .75-quarts per minute for drinkers used by 
lactating sows). 
 60. For example, the American Meat Institute voted in 2002 to make animal welfare a non-
competitive issue in the industry on the theory that this would promote open sharing of ideas, 
information, and expertise to enhance animal handling and welfare. American Meat Institute, AMI 
Board Votes to Make Animal Welfare a Non-Competitive Issue: Vote Signifies Industry’s Ongoing 
Commitment to Optimal Animal Handling in Plants (Oct. 24, 2002),  http://www.meatami.com/ 
Template.cfm?Section=Archived&template=PressReleaseDisplay.cfm&PressReleaseID=1317. 
 61. Humane Farm Animal Care, supra note 40. 
 62. American Humane Association, supra note 41. 
 63. Certified Humane Certification Program Frequently Asked Questions, 
http://www.certifiedhumane.org/faq.html (last visited Feb. 1, 2006) (describing the Certified Humane 
certification process); The Free Farmed Certification Process, http://www.americanhumane.org/ 
site/PageServer?pagename=pa_farm_animals_ff_cert_process (last visited Feb. 1, 2006) (describing the 
Free Farmed certification process). 
 64. See UNITED EGG PRODUCERS CERTIFIED, supra note 49. 
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file a monthly compliance report with UEP, and pass an annual audit conducted 
by independent auditors designated and approved by UEP.65 
The Certified Humane, Free Farmed, and UEP labeling programs should be 
distinguished from other auditing and monitoring regimes that have no 
certification component. Such programs have been prevalent on the industry 
side. The American Meat Institute promotes regular self-audits by slaughter 
plants to measure their compliance with AMI’s animal-welfare guidelines.66 The 
National Pork Board administers the voluntary Swine Welfare Assurance 
Program (SWAP) for American pork producers to assess the care and welfare 
of their pigs according to criteria set forth by the National Pork Board’s Animal 
Welfare Committee.67 After the assessment, and regardless of how well or 
poorly the assessment goes, SWAP registers the producer with the National 
Pork Board as a SWAP Assessed Site and the producer receives a SWAP 
Assessed Certificate.68 
One of the more robust programs on the industry side is the animal welfare 
program established by the Food Marketing Institute (FMI) and the National 
Council of Chain Restaurants (NCCR). The FMI and NCCR collectively 
represent food retailers, food wholesalers, and chain restaurants. They have 
developed animal-welfare guidelines for a variety of different species, in 
collaboration with the National Chicken Council, the National Pork Board, and 
similar trade groups.69 Until recently, FMI and NCCR maintained the “Animal 
Welfare Assurance Program” by which producers could request an audit to 
measure their compliance with those standards.70  Because of low participation 
rates, the AWAP program is no longer functioning, but producers and retailers 
remain able to arrange their own audits privately to measure compliance with 
the FMI–NCCR guidelines.71 There is no provision for release of audit results to 
the public.72 Increasing participation rates and making inspection results 
available to the public would help, but by themselves, these steps would not 
overcome the most serious problems facing the competing labeling, auditing, 
and monitoring regimes, which are their complexity and their sheer quantity. 
 
 65. Requirements of a United Egg Producers Certified Company, http://www.uepcertified.com/ 
abouttheprogram.html (last visited Feb. 1, 2006). Of 204 applicants for certification, only eleven have 
failed the first audit. Failed applicants are given sixty days to improve conditions; only one producer 
has failed a second time. Telephone interview with Gene Gregory, Senior Vice President, United Egg 
Producers (Oct. 7, 2004). 
 66. See AMERICAN MEAT INSTITUTE, supra note 46, at 4. 
 67. Swine Welfare Assurance Program, supra note 52. 
 68. See Swine Welfare Assurance Program, How do I participate in SWAP as a Producer?, 
http://www.pork.org/Producers/SWAP/SWAP.aspx (last visited Feb. 1, 2006). 
 69. See Food Marketing Institute, supra note 50. 
 70. Food Marketing Institute & The National Council of Chain Restaurants, Food Marketing 
Institute, The National Council of Chain Restaurants (NCCR) and the Food Marketing Institute (FMI) 
Announce Certification of First Auditors; Slaughter Plants Can Request Animal Welfare Audits, Apr. 17, 
2003, http://www.fmi.org/media/mediatext.cfm?id=522. 
 71. Telephone interview with Karen Brown, Senior Vice President, Food Marketing Inst. (Nov. 30, 
2006). 
 72. Id. 
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The average consumer does not have, and will not expend the time and energy 
to obtain, an adequate understanding of the competing animal-husbandry 
guidelines or the variations in inspection methodologies and frequency. 
The promulgation of best-practice guidelines and animal-welfare 
certification regimes for food producers is important and valuable. In terms of 
delivering useful information to consumers, however, these regimes have 
serious flaws. What might be done instead? 
VI 
A MODEST PROPOSAL 
Food producers should make disclosures about their treatment of animals in 
a way that is genuinely useful to consumers. Existing moral commitments draw 
current practices into serious question, and consumers should be permitted to 
express their commitments through their purchasing decisions. Hence 
disclosure would serve a market-improving function in a domain in which many 
consumers should be expected to be willing to pay for more in the way of 
animal welfare. In addition, moral beliefs, with respect to treatment of animals, 
should be made a more significant part of democratic discussion and debate, in 
a way that would undoubtedly cause changes in both practices and beliefs. 
Animal welfare is infrequently a salient issue in political life in part because the 
underlying conduct is not seen. Indeed, many consumers would be stunned to 
see the magnitude of the suffering produced by current practices.73 But 
deliberative discussion cannot occur unless citizens have the information with 
which to engage in it. 
In fact, there are likely to be dynamic interactions between the market-
perfecting and democracy-improving functions of disclosure. With respect to 
animal welfare, most people’s values are not firm and fixed. Their moral 
commitments, and even their behavior, are endogenous to what they know and 
to what they learn from others. Many of those who think that they do not care 
about animal welfare might well change their minds and their behavior if they 
are exposed to certain kinds of mistreatment. Those who are relatively 
indifferent to the topic might be less indifferent once they hear what other 
citizens have to say. In the domain of race and sex equality, an emphasis on 
concrete practices helped to activate general public concern. The same is likely 
 
 73. In fact, the Better Business Bureau (BBB) recently recommended that United Egg Producers 
discontinue its “Animal Care Certified” label on the grounds that it misleads consumers. See 
Associated Press, Business Group Shells Egg-industry Ads: Better Business Bureau Disputes Humane 
Claim, May 11, 2004, available at http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/4951194/ [hereinafter Egg-industry 
Ads]. The BBB found that the UEP standards actually improved animal treatment, but that industry 
standards for the treatment of egg-laying hens—which allow for artificially inducing molting through 
food withdrawal and for trimming or burning off birds’ beaks—would not be considered “humane” by 
most consumers. See id. In October 2005, with encouragement from the Federal Trade Commission, the 
United Egg Producers agreed to stop using the Animal Care Certified label, and instead agreed to label 
eggs as “United Egg Producers Certified.” See Alexei Barrionuevo, Egg Producers Relent on Industry 
Seal, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 4, 2005, at C18. 
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to be true here. For advocates of animal welfare, the hope would be for a kind 
of virtuous spiral, in which disclosure helped to heighten discussion and debate 
in a way that did not merely activate, but instead transformed and deepened, 
existing moral commitments. 
Whether or not this is likely, disclosure policies, initiated voluntarily or 
required, could strengthen both market processes and political ones. In this 
way, our proposal draws on the market-improving and democracy-facilitating 
functions of many recent regulatory initiatives. Here, as elsewhere, it would be 
best if producers voluntarily disclosed the relevant information, spurred 
perhaps by growing consumer interest and by the hope on the part of some 
producers that disclosure of good practices would increase market share. But it 
is also worth considering disclosure mandates, at the state and even national 
levels. 
What kind of disclosure should occur? This article does not attempt to 
create a blueprint. The aim is to suggest a general approach, not to specify a 
means of implementing it. But the first points, growing out of past experience 
with disclosure strategies,74 are the simplest. Any disclosure must be relevant to 
consumers’ moral beliefs, compatible with their existing routines, delivered at 
the right time, and written in concise, comprehensible language. On the 
producer side, disclosure will be most effective if it prompts consumers to act in 
ways that matter to producers and if producers find it feasible to respond to 
consumers’ reactions. 
As a threshold matter, whatever disclosure is made might well be contained 
on the food label itself. Consumers are accustomed to consulting labels for 
nutritional information and organic food claims; adding an animal welfare 
labeling component would be consistent with how consumers already shop. This 
is the central insight of the Certified Humane and similar logos. Information on 
the label stands a chance of reaching the average consumer, but off-label 
information is likely to be seen only by the most motivated of consumers.75 
Would significant numbers of consumers care enough about animal welfare 
to look at a label? Perhaps the best evidence of consumer interest in animal 
welfare is the speed with which producers and retailers are moving to position 
themselves as supporters of humane animal treatment through the certification 
and auditing programs discussed earlier.76 Nor is industry missing the mark in 
reacting in this way. Many people believe that human beings can and should 
 
 74. See supra notes 32–37. 
 75. Labeling food sold in grocery stores is a familiar practice. Applying a labeling system to other 
food outlets—deli counters, restaurants, hot dog stands, and the like—is imaginable, but considerably 
more challenging. Should a restaurant have to trace and disclose the practices of each supplier of every 
kind of meat and other animal product on the menu? How available must the disclosure be? Must it be 
made part of the menu, or, as is the case with nutritional claims, is it enough to require restaurants to 
have the information available upon request? See 21 C.F.R. § 101.9(j)(2)(i) (2006). Although the 
practical difficulties are perhaps greater with non-grocery store food outlets, there are many 
possibilities for displaying a label or labels that could be effective, including menus, food packaging, 
and prominently displayed signs. 
 76. See supra notes 46–52. 
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take more steps to reduce animal suffering, and this concern is reflected in 
public opinion surveys,77 studies on consumers’ willingness to pay higher prices 
for better treatment of animals,78 and the growing consumer interest in products 
that make claims regarding humane treatment of animals.79 The challenge, then, 
is to design a food label that provides the maximum amount of useful, 
accessible animal-welfare information. There are two major possibilities here. 
The first is to rely on a trusted intermediary, one who sifts through all the 
relevant information and comes up with a rating. Intermediaries of this kind—
offering thumbs up or thumbs down, one to four stars, or letter grades from A 
to F—are pervasive; they figure in everything from movie ratings to automobile 
roll-over tests to investment analysts’ buy-sell recommendations. Certified 
Humane and similar logos all rely on this approach, in the sense that the 
consumer turns over the analysis of the food producers to the certifying agency, 
which has expertise in humane animal treatment. Use of intermediaries makes 
sense when consumers ultimately can judge whether the intermediary is doing 
an adequate job. 
For food, however, there is a serious difficulty: A consumer has no easy 
basis for deciding that the animal-welfare ratings of a particular certifying 
agency are wrong or inferior to that of a competing certifying agency. The meat 
does not look or taste any different. An intermediary could rate the 
intermediaries—witness Consumer Union’s ratings of other organization’s eco-
labels80—but this just pushes the problem up a level. 
 
 77. See supra note 5. 
 78. See, e.g., Agriculture Online, Survey Shows Consumers Value Humane Treatment of Poultry, 
Mar. 1, 2004, http://www.agriculture.com/ag/story.jhtml?storyid=/templatedata/ag/story/data/agNews_ 
51370.xml (finding fifty-four percent of consumers would be willing to spend five to ten percent more 
for products certified as protective of animal care, and an additional ten percent would be receptive to 
paying fifteen to twenty percent more); David Dickinson & DeeVon Bailey, Willingness-to-Pay for 
Information: Experiential Evidence on Product Traceability from the USA, Canada, the U.K., and Japan 
12–13 (Utah State Univ. Econ. Research Inst., Working Paper No. 12, 2003), available at 
http://www.econ.usu.edu/Research/03/ERI2003-12.pdf (showing that consumers are willing to pay four 
to nine percent more for pork and nine to twenty-eight percent more for beef that carries additional 
guarantees of humane animal treatment and meat safety); Richard M. Bennett & Ralph J.P. Blaney, 
Estimating the Benefits of Farm Animal Welfare Legislation Using the Contingent Valuation Method, 29 
AGRIC. ECON. 85, 85–98 (2003) (surveying U.K. citizens’ willingness to pay to support legislation to 
phase out the use of battery cages for egg production in the European Union and concluding that the 
estimated benefits of the legislation outweigh the costs); R.M. Bennett, J. Anderson, & R.J.P. Blaney, 
Moral Intensity and Willingness to Pay Concerning Farm Animal Welfare Issues and the Implications for 
Agricultural Policy, 15 J. AGRIC. & ENVTL. ETHICS 187, 193 (2002) (showing that survey participants in 
the U.K. were willing to pay approximately $1.68 per week more for eggs from chickens raised outside 
of cages). 
 79. See Rod Smith, Consumer Views on Animal Production Pushing Toward More Ethical 
Husbandry, FEEDSTUFFS, Jan. 1, 2001, available at http://www.upc-online.org/010101feedstuffs.html 
(discussing the industry impact of consumers’ preferences for humane treatment of food animals); 
Swine Welfare Assurance Program, supra note 52 (explaining that increased consumer awareness of 
animal welfare necessitates proactive industry action). 
 80. See Consumers Union, The Consumers Union Guide to Environmental Labels, http://www.eco-
labels.org/home.cfm (last visited Feb. 1, 2006). Consumers Union provides ratings for some labels but 
not others. See id. “Certified Humane Raised and Handled” and “Free Farmed” labels are both rated 
“highly meaningful”; the United Egg Producer’s logo is not rated at all. See id. 
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A second problem with relying on intermediaries is that such reliance misses 
a key opportunity to enlighten consumers about some of the actual, concrete 
practices that underlie the raising of animals for food—practices that, if 
consumers were confronted with them, might cause a rethinking of existing 
preferences for certain foods. Labels like “Certified Humane” and “Free 
Farmed” by themselves tell consumers nothing about the underlying methods 
involved—what, exactly, is being done to animals in the production of food. 
Suppose it is true that consumers have different intuitions from industry 
insiders about what counts as humane treatment of animals; recall the consumer 
reaction in polls when it was revealed that Animal Care Certified standards 
permitted beak trimming, crowded cages, and similar conditions.81 If so, then 
even the best practices in the industry may be found morally questionable. 
It is possible to imagine an alternative approach: a label that gives 
consumers at least some concrete and pertinent information about underlying 
animal-treatment practices. A new form of label could be designed that would 
clearly and simply indicate the producer’s compliance with a select, limited 
number of standards that have the greatest impact on animal welfare, that 
reflect practices with the most salience to consumers, and that have the greatest 
potential to highlight differences among producers’ practices. The specific 
standards that would be reflected on the label would vary for different animal 
species, depending on the specific issues of concern for that species and that 
industry. The standards could change over time, as well, as the issues of concern 
change. This new form of label might appear on food packaging at the retail 
level, alongside the familiar nutritional information labeling. Such a labeling 
approach would deliver relevant information without being overwhelming; 
would facilitate comparisons across producers, thus fostering competition; and 
would give consumers some idea of the practices that are involved in producing 
the foods that they eat. 
The criteria appearing on such a label would be very different from the 
criteria currently used in the various auditing and certification regimes surveyed 
earlier.82 For example, instead of a guideline requiring that atmospheric 
ammonia in broiler-chicken facilities not exceed so many parts per million,83 a 
consumer-focused label might contain disclosure of the frequency with which 
chickens suffer from chemical burns caused by lying in unsanitary litter.84 
 
 81. See Egg-industry Ads, supra note 73. 
 82. See supra Part V. 
 83. The National Chicken Council Guidelines require ammonia levels to be below twenty-five 
parts per million.  NATIONAL CHICKEN COUNCIL, supra note 47. The Humane Farm Animal Care 
guidelines require that ammonia levels not exceed ten parts per million on average and never exceed 
twenty-five parts per million. Humane Farm Animal Care: Animal Care Standards, Broiler Chickens, 
supra note 40, at 7. 
 84. Litter saturated with urine and excrement leads to high ammonia concentrations, and chickens 
exposed to unsanitary litter for long periods can suffer blisters and burns on their feet, legs, and breasts. 
For a summary of research on the health effects of unsanitary litter, see REPORT OF THE SCIENTIFIC 
COMM. ON ANIMAL HEALTH AND ANIMAL WELFARE, THE WELFARE OF CHICKENS KEPT FOR 
MEAT PRODUCTION (BROILERS) 39–40 (2000), available at http://europa.eu.int/comm/ 
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Instead of a guideline on the handling and catching of birds,85 a label might 
disclose the frequency (or absence) of bruises, broken wings, and birds that are 
dead on arrival at the processing plant, all of which can result from rough 
handling. The label might also disclose the extent to which the producer 
provides the birds with access to straw, hay, or similar biodegradable material 
for environmental enrichment and expression of natural behaviors. The most 
effective label criteria are likely to be those that focus on health and welfare 
outcomes for the animals that are not only important from an animal-welfare 
perspective but are also easily imagined by consumers. Thus, some husbandry 
practices that are no doubt important from a welfare perspective—a lighting 
standard, for instance—may prove difficult to translate to a consumer-based 
label unless they can be cast in terms of tangible health and welfare effects. 
Consumers would not know, without further research, what happens to the 
birds if they get too little or too much light, whereas the frequency or absence 
of physical injuries, or opportunities for movement and environmental 
enrichment, are easily grasped. 
Because of the need for brevity and the difficulty in distilling some animal-
welfare criteria, a consumer-focused label could not hope to capture the full 
range of important factors that bear on animal welfare. Of course framing 
effects would greatly matter. Information can be conveyed in many different 
ways, and some ways of conveying information would have far more impact 
than others.86 The label would most likely serve to complement, rather than 
supplant, the further development of certification and auditing regimes. 
There is a hidden virtue, however, in the label’s inevitable incompleteness. 
Decisions as to which factors make it on to the label, and how those factors will 
be described, will involve judgment calls, which will no doubt be subject to 
considerable discussion among producer groups, animal-welfare organizations, 
and (for mandatory disclosure regimes) government regulators as well. A 
producer may be reluctant to disclose welfare criteria that paint a grim picture 
in consumers’ minds of how animals are treated (e.g., frequency of ammonia 
burns or broken bones for broiler chickens), even when the producer performs 
better on those criteria than its competitors. (Recall the importance of framing 
effects.) In voluntary labeling systems, at least, the language describing the 
welfare criteria will need to be crafted to accommodate this concern. This may 
 
food/fs/sc/scah/out39_en.pdf (produced for the European Commission Health & Consumer Protection 
Directorate-General). For more details on the health and cost effects of poor litter quality 
management, see CASEY W. RITZ ET AL., LITTER QUALITY AND BROILER PERFORMANCE 1267 
(2005), available at http://pubs.caes.uga.edu/caespubs/pubs/PDF/B1267.pdf. 
 85. The National Chicken Council guidelines provide, among other things, that “[w]henever birds 
are handled for any reason, including vaccinations, treatments, and movement to new facilities or to 
processing, handling should be accomplished in such a manner as to avoid injuries. Abuse of the 
animals should not be tolerated under any circumstances. . . . The number of birds in the catcher’s hand 
depends on the size of the bird and should not cause injury to the birds. For birds weighing more than 
four pounds, the maximum number of birds per hand is five.” See NATIONAL CHICKEN COUNCIL, 
supra note 47, at 8. 
 86. See Christine Jolls & Cass R. Sunstein, Debiasing Through Law, 35 J. LEGAL STUD. 199 (2006). 
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not be an insurmountable problem. A disclosure can be cast as “ninety-eight 
percent of the birds are injury-free” just as easily, and just as accurately, as “two 
percent of birds suffer from broken bones or ammonia burns.” The emphasis is 
different, of course, and producers and animal advocates will disagree about 
which they prefer; the “ninety-eight percent are injury-free” phrase seems far 
more comforting than the idea that “two percent suffer from broken bones or 
burns.” The larger point is that discussion of what should be on the label would 
help stimulate public debate on existing practices and animal welfare in much 
the same way that development of a federal definition of “organic” and related 
claims has focused debate on organic standards. Both the label and the process 
for developing the label would move animal-welfare issues into the fore. 
The emphasis here has been on disclosure through food labels, but a more 
modest approach would enlist the Internet to publicize information about 
practices that bear on animal welfare. It is easy to imagine a new website that 
collects relevant information and makes it easily available to those who are 
interested, for purposes of either consumer choices or democratic initiatives. 
The Toxic Release Inventory is effective in part because of the easy availability, 
via the Internet, of relevant information. A private website might well initiate a 
similar process for animal welfare. If such a step would not do as much as a 
consumer label, at least it would provide a helpful start. 
If a labeling or other disclosure regime could be created to give consumers 
insight into actual practices affecting animal welfare, how would producers be 
affected? Disclosure regimes are effective in inducing changes in behavior only 
to the extent that disclosers are able to detect and respond to audience reaction. 
There is every reason to believe that these conditions would be present for 
producers. Consumers vote with their pocketbooks and, to say the least, 
producers are sensitive to profits and market share. If disclosure of animal-
welfare information causes a shift in consumer demand, producers will detect 
the shift and be motivated to accommodate that demand. 
How easily could producers shift their methods to accommodate new 
demand for humane practices? A number of factors, all involving cost, would 
come into play: the cost, for producers, of increased adherence to animal 
welfare standards; the extent to which producers would be able to pass these 
extra costs on to consumers; the speed with which producers could shift to more 
humane techniques; and the cost, for food retailers, of switching their suppliers 
to those that use more humane methods. The answers to these questions would 
vary by industry, but there is little doubt that movement by food producers 
towards humane animal husbandry would be constrained by the expense of that 
movement. Producers would, in short, follow some kind of cost-benefit 
balancing, in which the benefits of humane treatment (measured by the 
intensity of consumer demand for it) would be measured by the costs of 
providing it. 
Unfortunately, there is little systematic evidence one way or the other on 
the costs of humane food-production practices in a global, industry-wide sense. 
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An existing literature does address the feasibility of specific humane farming 
techniques,87 and still other studies have identified changes in farming or 
production techniques that enhance both animal welfare and profitability. Thus, 
we know that stockpersons should treat animals non-aversively,88 piglets should 
have toys,89 sheep should have moderate ventilation,90 cows should not be 
continuously bred,91 and dairy cows should not have their tails docked.92 As 
these studies show, it is possible to compare the animal welfare benefits of 
changing specific practices with the costs to producers of doing so, and research 
in this vein will be crucial in determining the feasibility of particular shifts in 
animal treatment that could arise through a disclosure regime. 
Lest cost concerns loom too large, however, it is important to remember 
there is nothing in a labeling system like that proposed here that would require 
producers to change any of their practices. Producers who choose not to pursue 
animal-welfare-enhancing practices and instead prefer to compete only on the 
dimension of price would be free to do so. If the costs of increased animal 
welfare outweigh the benefits, measured in terms of consumer preferences, then 
our proposal would produce no behavioral change at all.  Changes in producer 
behavior would occur only in response to market forces, as consumers are 
empowered to make food choices that take into account their preferences for 
different levels of animal welfare. 
 
 87. See, e.g., H.L.I. Bornett, J.H. Guy, & P.J. Cain, Impact of Animal Welfare on Costs and 
Viability of Pig Production in the UK, 16 J. AGRIC. ENVTL. ETHICS 163–86 (2003) (comparing 
profitability of different pig-rearing systems and concluding that pig welfare can be improved 
significantly with a modest increase in cost, but that the current higher cost for pigs raised in high 
welfare systems must be maintained if high welfare producers are to continue to be profitable); cf. 
Dermot J. Hayes & Helen H. Jensen, Lessons from the Danish Ban on Feed-Grade Antibiotics, CTR. 
FOR AGRIC. AND RURAL DEV., Briefing Paper 03-BP 41 (2003), available at 
http://www.card.iastate.edu/publications/DBS/PDFFiles/03bp41.pdf (presenting an economic analysis 
of the consequences of a ban on antibiotic use in food animals in the United States). 
 88. E.g., P.H. Hemsworth, G.J. Coleman, J.L. Barnett & S. Borg, Relationships between Human-
Animal Interactions and Productivity of Commercial Dairy Cows, 78 J. ANIMAL SCI. 2821, 2821–31 
(2000); P.H. Hemsworth, G.J. Coleman, J.L. Barnett, S. Borg & S. Dowling, The Effects of Cognitive 
Behavioral Intervention on the Attitude and Behavior of Stockpersons and the Behavior and Productivity 
of Commercial Dairy Cows, 80 J. ANIMAL SCI. 68, 68–78 (2002); P.H. Hemsworth, G.J. Coleman, & 
J.L. Barnett, Improving the Attitude and Behavior of Stockpersons toward Pigs and the Consequences 
on the Behavior and Reproductive Performance of Commercial Pigs, 39 APPLIED ANIMAL BEHAV. SCI. 
349, 349–62 (1994); B.D. Voisinet, T. Grandin, J.D. Tatum, S.F. O’Connor & J.J. Struthers, Feedlot 
Cattle with Calm Temperaments Have Higher Average Daily Gains than Cattle with Excitable 
Temperaments, 75 J. ANIMAL SCI. 892, 892–96 (1997). 
 89. E.S. Jolly, J.B. Gaughan, & A.K. King, Environmental Enrichment for Neonatal Pigs and its 
Influence on Post Weaning Aggression, 80 J. ANIMAL SCI. 25, 25–26 (Supp. 1 2002). 
 90. A. Sevi, M. Albenzio, G. Annicchiarico, M. Caroprese, R. Marino & L Taibi, Effects of 
Ventilation Regimen on the Welfare and Performance of Lactating Ewes in Summer, 80 J. ANIMAL SCI. 
2349, 2349–61 (2002). 
 91. L.A. Werth, S.M. Azzam, M.K. Nielsen, & J.E. Kinder, Use of a Simulation Model to Evaluate 
the Influence of Reproductive Performance and Management Decisions on Net Income in Beef 
Production, 69 J. ANIMAL SCI. 4710, 4710–21 (1991). 
 92. C.A. Lunam, A.M. de Passille, & J. Rushen, Neuroma Formation following Tail Docking of 
Dairy Calves, 80 J. ANIMAL SCI. Supp. 1/85 J. DAIRY SCI. Supp. 1 (2002); C.B. Tucker & D.M. Weary, 
Tail Docking in Dairy Cattle, 11 ANIMAL WELFARE INFO. CTR. BULLETIN 3–4 (Winter 2001–Spring 
2002). 
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VII 
CONCERNS AND COUNTERARGUMENTS 
Because disclosure strategies are so modest, we believe it is not easy to 
defend serious objections and counterarguments. But it is possible to identify 
some directions from which criticisms might be launched. 
The first set of objections would come from those committed to animal 
welfare and animal rights. As we have suggested, those concerned about animal 
suffering will challenge the idea that the protection of animals should depend 
on how much human beings are willing to pay to reduce that suffering. In many 
contexts, the willingness-to-pay criterion is wholly inadequate. Various civil 
rights statutes forbid discrimination, and they do not stand or fall on the basis of 
an assessment of whether consumers, or potential victims of discrimination, are 
willing to pay a specified amount to reduce discrimination. The Endangered 
Species Act does not protect endangered species only to the extent that 
consumers are willing to pay enough to ensure their protection. If animal 
suffering is an independent concern—and our argument suggests that it is—
then a market in such suffering seems wholly inadequate, perhaps even a kind 
of joke. 
We have offered no challenge to the idea that the suffering of animals ought 
not to depend on how much people are willing to pay to prevent it. But at the 
very least, people should be allowed to provide further protection to animals if 
they are willing to pay for that protection. A serious problem with the current 
situation is that it does not provide an easy mechanism by which people can 
express their moral commitments. Even if such a mechanism would do far less 
than ought to be done, the argument on its behalf is straightforward. Those who 
have especially strong commitments to animal rights and animal welfare should 
welcome a step in this direction—if only because it will increase the visibility of 
the practices to which they object, in a way that might well lead to more 
significant change. Recall that our proposal is agnostic on the most ambitious 
claims about human treatment of animals; the hope is that disclosure strategies 
might be favored by those with competing views about those claims. 
We can imagine a different kind of objection. Why should disclosure 
principles focus on the use of animals? There are many possible candidates for 
disclosure to consumers, even if food is our only concern. Disclosure might be 
encouraged or mandated for environmental effects, salaries of high-level 
employees and salaries of low-level employees, workplace accidents, layoffs, 
charitable activities on the part of firms, and much more. For all of these items, 
consumers might be willing to pay something to ensure compliance with their 
moral commitments. But a market in morality might create a range of problems. 
For one thing, consumers might not have an adequate understanding of the 
meaning of any particular disclosure, and their reactions might not be entirely 
rational. (What is the rational response to significant layoffs in the last year, or 
to $25,000 annual salaries for many employees?) There is also a serious 
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question of priority-setting: Why should any particular item be singled out for 
disclosure, as opposed to various others? 
These are perfectly legitimate questions, and our proposal does not make 
any general claims about the limits of disclosure or even about priority-setting. 
With respect to animal welfare, the argument for disclosure stems from the 
evident fact that many consumers do care, rationally, about suffering, and from 
the expectation that disclosure can be undertaken in a way that will be 
genuinely informative. Perhaps other information presents at least as strong an 
argument for disclosure. But it is not easy to find other areas in which existing 
moral commitments are so palpably ill-served by existing markets simply 
because the underlying practices are invisible. 
VIII 
CONCLUSION 
With respect to animal welfare, people’s practices do not correspond to their 
moral judgments, simply because people lack basic information about how 
animals are treated. A key question is how to make those practices more visible 
so as to enable consumers to choose as they wish. Our motivation here has been 
a belief that much more can be done to provide consumers with information 
that will enable them to make choices that fit with their values. 
Existing animal-welfare certification and assurance programs run by trade 
groups and animal-welfare organizations are steps in the right direction—but 
they are no more than that. A better labeling system could improve both 
market processes and democratic ones. It would improve markets because 
many consumers care about animal welfare, and they lack relevant information 
when they decide what to buy and what to eat. A degree of market competition, 
with respect to the treatment of animals, would be valuable for human beings 
and animals alike. A labeling system would improve democratic processes as 
well, because it would ensure that political judgments be based on a real 
awareness of the stakes. The most modest step, helping to accomplish similar 
goals, would be a website that collects relevant information about the treatment 
of animals used for food. But we have explored approaches that go well beyond 
that modest step by ensuring labeling that informs consumers of animal 
treatment. 
Defenders of animal rights are most unlikely to believe that a labeling 
regime will do all of what must be done. In their view, more aggressive 
measures, directly forbidding the cruelty and mistreatment, would be far better. 
But our goal here has been far more modest. A serious problem lies in the 
mismatch between people’s moral commitments and their actual practices. A 
disclosure regime might not bring human practices into alignment with what 
morality requires, but it would have the important virtue of moving those 
practices in the direction of existing moral beliefs. 
